Against Moral Responsibility
Against Moral Responsibility critiques the major contemporary arguments in support of moral responsibility, and argues that moral responsibility is implausible within a naturalistic world view. Belief in moral responsibility can be supported only by appeal to special miraculous self-making powers or by refusing to look deeper at the rich and detailed causes of human behavior. Careful scrutiny of contemporary research in psychology and biology and sociology leaves no room for plausible claims of moral responsibility. Advocates of moral responsibility claim that denial of moral responsibility would be disastrous; to the contrary, the moral responsibility system promotes harsh treatment, blocks understanding, and results in blaming the victim, while the rejection of moral responsibility opens the way to deeper and better understanding which leads to more humane policies and a more equitable social structure. Because of the powerful and pervasive moral responsibility system challenges to moral responsibility are difficult: challenges to such deep assumptions seem absurd, because they are examined from within the moral responsibility system.
Against Moral Responsibility was discussed by Daniel Dennett, Thomas Clark, and Bruce Waller on Clark's excellent site, Naturalism.org. That discussion can be accessed here.
Daniel Dennett's Naturalism.org review of Against Moral Responsibility can be found here.
William A. Rottschaefer's detailed review (in Behavior and Philosophy) is here; Bruce Waller's reply is here.
Daniel Dennett's Naturalism.org review of Against Moral Responsibility can be found here.
William A. Rottschaefer's detailed review (in Behavior and Philosophy) is here; Bruce Waller's reply is here.